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1.  Introduction 
The rise in the Social Security full retirement age (FRA)—from age 65 for 
individuals born before 1938 to age 67 for those born in 1960 or later—is equivalent to a 
universal benefit cut for retirees.  For example, those who claim at the earliest eligibility 
age (EEA), currently set at 62, receive 80 percent of their full benefit when the FRA is at 
age 65, 75 percent when the FRA is set at age 66, and just 70 percent when the FRA is set 
at age 67. While some retirees might choose to work longer to compensate for the 
reduction in expected lifetime wealth, for those who cannot work, the increase in the 
FRA could impose risks on their financial wellbeing.  
The FRA increase creates an incentive for retirees with work-limiting health 
problems to switch from Social Security’s Old Age (OA) insurance program to the Social 
Security Disability Insurance (DI) program. Because the DI benefit equals the full OA 
retirement benefit and is not reduced when claimed early, the generosity of the DI benefit 
is rising relative to the OA benefit.  Policymakers must identify the magnitude of any 
such “spillover” effect from the OA system to the DI system in order to estimate 
accurately the financial and welfare consequences of the rise in the FRA and to forecast 
the potential effects of policy proposals that seek to accelerate or extend the rise. If many 
retirees alternatively secure the DI benefit, planned savings associated with the FRA 
increase might be offset to a certain degree. On the other hand, the financial wellbeing of 
early retirees who cannot work might be protected by the alternative DI system.  
In this paper, we investigate the potential substitution between these two retirement 
channels—OA versus DI.  Based on a sample of wave-to-wave transitions by older 
 2 individuals born between 1931 and 1940 in the longitudinal Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), we find that those born after 1937 (i.e., those with higher FRAs) are more likely 
to apply for DI, even after we control for other covariates that are correlated with 
individual propensities to apply for DI (e.g., age, calendar year, life-time earnings 
(measured by Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME)), and the presence of a work-
limiting health problem).  We find that the average 0.33-year rise in the full retirement 
age for people born between 1938 and 1940 has resulted in a 0.04-0.30 percentage points 
increase in the DI application rate. The increase is even higher among individuals at or 
above age 62 and among individuals with health problems that limit their ability to work.  
We begin with an explanation of the potential causes of the spillover effect and a 
summary of results from previous studies on this subject in Sections 2 and 3. In Section 
4, we describe our data and analytical approach. Section 5 presents our results, and 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  The Relationship between OA System Characteristics and DI 
Applications 
An older worker must work 40 quarters in covered employment in order to be fully 
insured for OA benefits.  If 20 of those quarters were worked within the last 10 years, he 
or she is also insured for DI benefits. As a consequence of this recency requirement, DI 
insured status is less universal than OA insured status (Mitchell and Phillips, 2001). Any 
possible spillover between the two Social Security programs can only happen among 
people who are dually insured for both programs. 
 3 In principle, three policy parameters of the OA system could affect a DI-insured 
person’s decision to apply for DI: their full retirement age, the earliest eligibility age, and 
the Social Security earnings test.  Raising the FRA reduces the expected payment period 
and increases the reduction in benefit amount at early claiming ages necessary for 
actuarial balance.  Because the DI benefit is not actuarially reduced with claiming age, it 
becomes relatively more generous compared to the OA benefit when the FRA rises; this 
change in relative generosity could cause some individuals to substitute toward DI.  In 
addition, because DI benefits automatically convert to OA benefits when DI beneficiaries 
reach their FRA, a rise in the FRA also means that people gain the option to apply for DI 
during the period between the original FRA and the new FRA. This might lead to an 
increase in DI enrollment. 
Proposals to raise the FRA above age 67 usually also recommend that the EEA be 
raised above age 62. A rise in the EEA would likely have a substantial impact on the 
spillover effect because many retirees might only consider the choice between OA and DI 
once OA becomes available at the EEA. A GAO report (1999) suggests that the relatively 
easier option of claiming OA benefits (compared to the lengthy and complex DI 
application process, which includes medical screening) might prevent people from 
applying for DI after they reach EEA. The report shows that new DI awards as a 
percentage of the DI-covered population steadily grow with age but sharply drop at age 
62, which implies that the upward trend might continue past age 62 if the EEA were 
raised.  
Both OA and DI benefits are associated with restrictions on labor supply. DI 
requires a five-month period prior to application during which applicants may not work. 
 4 If approved, they may experiment with work while continuing their DI benefits for up to 
nine months, but in the tenth month benefits are abruptly terminated for any earnings 
above a low threshold ($940/month in 2008 for non-blind DI recipients). The milder 
labor supply restriction in the OA program comes through the earnings test, which 
amounts to a 50 percent implicit tax on earnings (above a threshold) and which applies to 
people between the age at which they claim OA benefits and age 70 before the year 2000 
or only until their full retirement age in 2000 or later.  Although the abolition of the 
earnings test above the FRA in 2000 partially relaxes this restriction, it does not change 
the relative generosity between OA and DI benefits, because DI benefits are 
automatically converted to OA benefits at the FRA. However, the relative strength of the 
work disincentives in the two programs may impact the desirability of the OA channel 
versus the DI channel, and any future reform aimed at altering the labor supply 
disincentives embodied in either program, could potentially affect the choice between the 
two retirement channels.  
DI beneficiaries become eligible for Medicare after they have received DI benefits 
for two years; thus, a DI award before age 63 is linked to additional value for people who 
need health insurance coverage. If the Medicare eligibility age were raised along with the 
FRA, older people with the option to do so would have an even greater incentive to 
switch to DI (GAO, 1999).  
Policymakers expect that raising the Social Security retirement ages will increase 
labor supply at older ages. This increase could lead to some secondary effects on DI 
applications. For instance, an increase in labor supply would mean that more people will 
 5 be insured for DI. It could also either improve or worsen individual health,
1 either of 
which effects could later affect DI eligibility.  
Although there are multiple direct and indirect links between the OA program and 
the DI program, this paper examines how increasing the FRA affects DI applications 
through the most direct channel: decreasing the relative generosity of OA benefits 
compared to DI benefits by widening the gap between the monthly OA and DI benefit 
amounts.  
 
3.  Previous Research 
The disability retirement channel has been frequently omitted in studies of the 
retirement behavior of elderly Americans (see, for example, French, 2005; Coile and 
Gruber, 2007), perhaps because the fraction of people retiring through this channel is 
much lower in the United States than in some European countries.  Among the studies 
that do mention the possible interaction between the two Social Security programs, some 
provide only rough estimates or upper and lower bounds on the size of the effect. In 
many cases, these estimates are based on aggregate statistics; these statistics include the 
proportion of people who claimed OA benefits at the EEA who also had work-limiting 
health problems (Panis et al., 2002) and the new DI award rate at or after the EEA 
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005). To our knowledge, only three groups of researchers 
(Mitchell and Phillips, 2000; Duggan et al., 2005 and 2007; Bound et al., 2008) have 
provided model-based estimates of this effect.  
                                                 
1 There has been no conclusive evidence in the literature on the health effect of delaying retirement. See 
Dave et al. (2006), Bound and Waidmann (2007) for studies on this topic.  
 6 Mitchell and Phillips (2000) used waves 1-4 of the HRS to estimate a conditional 
logit model of the choice between three retirement paths: retirement with DI, retirement 
with reduced OA benefits, and retirement with full OA benefits.  They simulate the 
consequence of reducing the present value associated with the early OA retirement path 
by $25,000 (an experiment not exactly equivalent to the two-year rise in the FRA, which 
makes their results hard to compare with the others) and find that the fraction of people 
who choose the DI path would increase by 0.6 percentage points. Mitchell and Phillips 
provide a complete picture of the retirement path choice set based on careful estimates of 
DI insured status. However, they assume that the probability of receiving a DI award 
conditional on application is constant (at 49 percent) for everyone, so their estimates 
cannot be interpreted as the effect of a potential OA benefit cut on the DI application 
rate.  
Also using the first four waves of the HRS, Bound, Stinebrickner, and Waidmann 
(2008) developed a dynamic programming model that includes detailed modeling of the 
DI application decision for single men. In their model, a simulated increase in the FRA to 
age 67 has a smaller effect on the one-year labor force exit rate through the DI 
application channel (0.2 percentage points) because, as they say, “most people in their 
60s have pretty good health.”  
Duggan, Singleton, and Song (2007) critique the two papers described above for 
not using actual behavioral responses to the ongoing policy change represented by the 
FRA increase. Using Social Security administrative data, they created a large sample of 
potential beneficiaries who were between ages 45 and 64 sometime during 1984 through 
2005. They estimate a linear regression model of age/year-specific DI enrollment rates, 
 7 with identification coming from policy-induced reductions in the present value of OA 
benefits across birth cohorts and age. Controlling for calendar year and age, they find a 
larger spillover effect than that reported in the Bound et al. (2008) study: a 0.6 percentage 
points increase in the DI enrollment rate among male beneficiaries above age 45 during 
the 22 years since 1984 as a result of the two-year increase in the FRA. In an earlier 
version of the paper (Duggan et al., 2005), they used the ratio of OA benefits to DI 
benefits to calculate the relative generosity of the two programs. They found that the 
effect of the ratio is highest at ages 63 and 64 for men (an increase of 0.6 percentage 
points in response to the two-year rise in the FRA), which suggests that people are more 
responsive to the policy change as they grow older and approach retirement. One 
limitation of their papers is that their dependent variable is the DI enrollment rate (the 
fraction of people on DI), which captures not only the flow of new awards, but the stock 
of past awards, as well as SSA’s subjective decision of whether or not to approve the 
application. A cleaner measure of the individual behavioral response to the policy change 
is the individual decision to newly apply for DI.  Another limitation is that their 2007 
paper does not distinguish people who are insured for DI or not when computing the 
denominator of the DI enrollment rate.  
To sum up, current estimates of the size of the spillover effect vary across these 
studies, but differences in methodology, especially with respect to the definition of the 
outcome variable, make comparisons across studies difficult.  None has examined actual 
changes in the decision to apply for DI in response to the rise in the FRA.  This paper 
tries to fill this gap.   
 
 8 4.  Data and Sample 
We use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to conduct a cohort comparison of 
DI application rates as illustrated in Table 1. The HRS currently has up to eight biennial 
interview waves (from 1992 to 2006) for a nationally representative sample of individuals 
born between 1931 and 1941 (so-called age-eligible respondents in the original HRS 
cohort). Among this sample, those born between 1931 and 1937 are the “control” cohorts, 
because their FRA remains unaffected at age 65; those born between 1938 and 1940 are 
the “treatment” cohorts because their FRA has been raised above age 65 by 2 months (if 
born in 1938), 4 months (if born in 1939) or 6 months (if born in 1940). We exclude from 
the sample people born in 1941 (most of them would not reach the FRA by Wave 8 in 
2006) and those born between 1931 and 1940 who attrited from the HRS before reaching 
their FRA. This sample restriction leaves a total of 6,748 individuals – 4,772 of them in 
the “control” cohort born before 1938 and 1,976 of them in the “treatment” cohort born in 
or after 1938.  We apply an additional sample restriction in which we drop everyone 
without matched SSA earnings records
2 because insured status for DI benefits (which is 
not universal) can only be derived using the historical records on annual earnings before 
the HRS baseline wave in 1992.  The SSA match rates are similar across the two cohorts 
in our sample: 85 percent in the “control” cohort and 84 percent in the “treatment” 
cohort, leaving altogether 4,061 respondents unaffected by the FRA rise and 1,666 
affected respondents.  
  The fourth through sixth columns of Table 1 illustrate how the difference in the 
FRA across the two cohorts leads to a difference in the relative generosity of OA and DI 
                                                 
2 Kapteyn et al. (2006) and Michaud and van Soest (2008) find that the matching of Social Security 
earnings records does not lead to a biased sample for the original HRS cohort.  
 9 benefits. The OA/DI benefit ratio at age 62 drops from 80 percent for the control cohort 
to 77.5 percent for the youngest members of the treatment cohort, those born in 1940.  
The age 62 OA/DI benefit ratio is also a valid approximate measure of relative generosity 
for individuals who apply for DI before age 62, if we assume that most potential DI 
applicants would claim OA benefits at the earliest eligibility age (Duggan et al., 2005). 
Compared to age 62, the cross-cohort difference in the OA/DI benefit ratio is even higher 
at ages 63 and 64 (3.3 percent vs. 2.5 percent as the difference between the control cohort 
and those born in 1940).  
We next compare age-specific DI application rates across the treatment and control 
cohorts. In the first panel of Figure 1, we plot the percentage of people who ever applied 
for DI
3 by age separately according to whether their FRA is 65 or greater than 65. 
Interestingly, the “treatment” cohort has a significantly higher chance of ever being a DI 
applicant. The average probability of having ever applied for DI from ages 55 to 63 is 
13.6 percent for the control cohort and 17.3 percent for the treatment cohort.
4  This large 
difference in the stock of past DI applications suggests that a significant part of the recent 
rapid growth in the DI caseload (Autor and Duggan, 2006) might be generated by 
individuals who apply (and receive awards) well before their mid 50s.  In that sense, we 
argue that the outcome variable used by Duggan et al. (2005, 2007) (the stock of 
beneficiaries as a percent of the insured population) might capture changes in behavior 
                                                 
3 The HRS did not ask separate survey questions regarding DI and SSI application before Wave 5. SSI is 
generally considered a disability program for people who are not insured for DI and younger than 65.  
Since our outcome measure (DI application rate, described later) is conditional on being insured by DI, we 
rule out the possibility that any of the applications in our sample are associated with SSI.      
4 The respondents in the treatment cohort enter the HRS at younger ages (52-54) and are likely to be more 
“experienced” with the interviews when reporting previous DI applications at ages above mid 50s. One 
might worry about potential bias caused by this cohort difference; however, Weir and Smith (2005) argue 
that the so-called panel-conditioning effect is small in the context of the HRS.  
 
 10 among prime-age workers in addition to those approaching retirement.  It is certainly 
possible that the treatment cohort might have responded to the FRA rise by increasing DI 
applications well before their mid 50s; however, as explained in Duggan et al. (2005), 
individuals should be less willing to forego their expected labor income in exchange for 
higher retirement benefits when they are farther away from retirement. An alternative 
explanation for the rise in DI applications among middle-aged Americans is the rising 
prevalence of disability due to obesity and associated health problems (Lakdawalla et al., 
2004; Goldman et al., 2005).   
  The large cohort difference in the stock of previous DI applications does not 
necessarily imply a large difference in the flow of new DI applications – which is the key 
outcome variable in this paper. Since the HRS is a biennial survey, we define the DI 
application rate as the fraction of people who applied for DI between time t (or wave w) 
and time t+2 (or wave w+1) conditional on having the option of applying for DI at time t. 
To choose the correct pool of people who can apply for DI in the interval between two 
waves, people who are not insured for DI (due to insufficient numbers of total or recent 
quarters of coverage) at the earlier wave are excluded from the denominator. In the 
second panel of Figure 1, we plot the age profile of DI-insured status by cohort
5. 
Strikingly, we find that respondents in the treatment cohort are more likely to be insured 
for DI.  Between ages 55 and 63, the average DI coverage rate is 71.2 percent for those in 
the treatment cohort compared to 66.5 percent for those in the control cohort. This cohort 
difference in DI-insured status reflects the reversal of the early retirement trend in recent 
                                                 
5 We combine the SSA earnings records and annual employment/earnings information in the HRS core 
survey to determine the total number of quarters of coverage during one’s life time and in the last 10 years. 
DI insured status at each wave is computed using the estimated history of annual quarters of coverage 
before the wave.  
 11 years (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2008) and the stronger labor force attachment of later 
birth cohorts (Maestas, 2007).   
   It is worth noting that people who are insured for DI are always insured for the 
OA benefit as well (while the reverse is not true). Therefore we can interpret DI 
application behavior as an individual’s choice between the two retirement channels. For 
people insured for DI but who did not apply for DI before their FRA, we know they will 
eventually retire with the OA benefits.  
  Besides dropping time t to time t+2 transitions associated with time t non-insured 
status, we also exclude respondents who were already receiving or applying for DI at 
time t and respondents’ whose time t age is greater than age 63 (thus the corresponding 
time t+2 age might exceed the FRA) or below age 55 (which is the lowest age that we 
can observe the DI application behaviors of both cohorts).  In addition, we drop 
observations with missing values in time t covariates.  Applying all the restrictions 
described above, we end up with 7,654 time t to t+2 transitions from the control cohort 
and 4,174 transitions from the treatment cohort. Altogether we have 11,828 person-wave 
observations in our analysis sample.  
In the analyses that follow, we compute treatment effects for all DI-insured 
individuals and for those who are disabled.  We assign disability status on the basis of 
responses to the HRS work limitation question, “Do you have any impairment or health 
problem that limits the kind or amount of paid work you can do?”
 6  Benitez-Silva et al. 
                                                 
6In Wave 7, if re-interviewees had previously reported having a work-limiting health condition, they were 
assumed to still have the condition.  Using hot-deck imputation based on demographic characteristics, 
socioeconomic status, and health status, we find that some of those assumed to still have a work-limiting 
condition in Wave 7 are not likely to actually still have one.  The imputation is based on answers given by 
all respondents between waves 5 and 8 who provided a valid ("yes" or "no") response to the work-
 12 (1999, 2004, 2006) have shown that HRS responses to this question and a follow-on 
question asking whether this limitation prevents them from working altogether can be 
considered an approximate sufficient statistic of “true” disability status
7 and an unbiased 
indicator of SSA’s ultimate DI award decision.  Since we are interested in DI application, 




5.  Results  
5.1 Cross Cohort Comparison of DI Application Rate  
In the third panel of Figure 1, we show the two-year DI application rate by cohort. 
The DI application rate is higher when individuals are in their mid 50s and declines 
smoothly with age, reflecting the declining opportunity cost of applying for DI (in terms 
of lost expected earnings) as people approach retirement. The DI application rate drops to 
its lowest level after people reach the earliest eligibility age for the OA benefit (62), 
suggesting that the availability of the OA benefit deters DI application. Surprisingly, the 
treatment cohort, which has a higher average FRA and also a higher probability of having 
previously applied for DI, has a relatively lower DI application rate overall.  
The difference in past DI application rates across treatment and control cohorts 
raises the possibility of compositional differences between the cohorts.  For example, 
                                                                                                                                                 
limitation questions.  Another important cross-wave difference is that beginning in Wave 7, "not working" 
is added as a possible response category.   
7 In the sense that other health variables add very little additional predictive power once the work limitation 
variable is included in models predicting DI application. 
8 See Burkhuaser et al. (2004) for a dynamic programming model of DI application that assumes workers 
start to make DI application timing decisions after the onset of a work limitation. 
 13 those in the “treatment” cohort who are not already receiving (or applying for) DI by time 
t  (i.e., those whom we retain in our sample) might have lower propensities for 
experiencing work-limiting health problems.  In order to control for this factor, in the 
fourth panel of Figure 1 we plot the DI application rate holding constant disability status 
at time t.  As expected, people with a work limitation at time t have much higher 
disability application rates between t and t+2.  The average application rate between ages 
55-63 conditional on having a work limitation at time t is about 12 percent compared to 
1.5 percent among those without a work limitation at time t.  In other words, most DI 
applications come from individuals with health problems that limit their work ability. 
Among those with no work limitation, DI application rates are almost the same across the 
treatment and control cohorts. Among those with a work limitation, the cohort difference 
in the DI application rate is not exactly the same as that in the third panel: the treatment 
cohort has lower DI application rates between ages 55 and 61, but slightly higher DI 
application rates at ages 62 and 63.  
Putting the third and the fourth panels together, we can see that age and the 
existence of a work limitation both have strong associations with DI application.  The 
sign and the magnitude of the cohort difference in the DI application rate also vary with 
work limitation and by whether age at time t is below 62 or not (i.e., according to whether 
the possibility of claiming OA benefits is part of the immediate choice set).  This 
suggests the treatment effect of the FRA increase on DI applications may vary by age and 
disability status.  
The descriptive analyses in Figure 1 imply that the treatment effect has the 
expected sign (that is, higher DI application rate for the cohort with higher FRA) only at 
 14 ages 62 and 63 among those with a work limitation at time t.  The difference itself is 
quite small (3.6 percent for the “control” cohort and 4.9 percent for the “treatment” 
cohort).  However, these contrasts control only for age and the presence of a work 
limitation. Since respondents are not actually randomly assigned to each cohort, there are 
likely to be cohort differences in other observable characteristics that may be related to 
the DI application propensity and thus confound the true effect.  We turn to an 
examination of such differences next.  
 
5.2 Cross Cohort Comparison of Other Related Variables  
In Table 2 we present for the treatment and control cohorts sample means of our 
outcome measure, measures of OA/DI relative generosity, life-time earnings and labor 
force attachment, health and disability status, and a set of demographics and 
socioeconomic status (SES) variables. We find no statistical difference between the 
average DI application rate across cohorts in the sample, although the “treatment” cohort 
contains a higher non-age-adjusted ratio of observations with past DI application 
experience (4.3 percent vs. 3.4 percent).  It is reasonable to expect that DI application 
decisions are serially correlated – those who applied before time t would be more likely 
to apply between time t and t+2 because they might have a more severe underlying 
disability level or they have other unobservables that make them more prone to apply for 
social welfare programs.
9  Benitez-Silva, et al. (1999) have shown that having previously 
applied for DI is a strong predictor of current DI application.  
                                                 
9 In addition, former beneficiaries who have had their benefits terminated for earnings above the substantial 
gainful activity threshold can reinstate benefits during a three-year Extended Period of Eligibility should 
they stop working and continue to be disabled.  
 15 We present three measures of the relative generosity between OA and DI. The first 
and most obvious one is the FRA itself: on average the FRA for the treatment cohort is 
0.33 years (or four months) higher than the control cohort’s FRA. The second measure is 
the ratio of the OA benefit to the DI benefit
10 at time t+1, which has already been shown 
in Table 1. Duggan et al. (2005) used the value of this ratio at age 62 as the key 
independent variable in their model.  Since the DI benefit amount is always larger than 
the OA benefit at any given age before the FRA (assuming the potential DI applicant 
stops working altogether and at t+1), this ratio is always below 1. We link the OA/DI 
ratio at 62 to wave-to-wave transitions with time t ages no older than 61. OA/DI ratios at 
age 63/64 are respectively associated with transitions with time t age at 62/63. Almost all 
of the variation in the OA/DI benefit ratio originates from the birth year difference. The 
treatment cohort has an average OA/DI ratio at 80.3 percent, which is significantly lower 
than that among the control cohort (82.7 percent).  
The third relative generosity measure is the ratio between the present values of the 
OA and DI benefit streams at time t+1. This present value ratio compares the entire 
expected Social Security wealth associated with each retirement path. It has more 
variation across individuals and age, but because it is based on life-time earnings and 
survival probabilities, it is less exogenous compared to the OA/DI benefit ratio. The 
                                                 
10 We use the SSA administrative earnings file for the original HRS cohort to compute OA and DI benefits, 
present values, and Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). The SSA administrative earnings files 
contain HRS respondents’ annual Social Security covered earnings from 1951 to 1991.  We forecast 
earnings forward by averaging respondents’ two highest years between the last five years of earnings when 
the SSA records are available (i.e., 1987-1991 for the original HRS cohort), then project the average 
forward assuming zero real annual growth. The respondents’ earnings data are fed into a set of Social 
Security retirement benefits computation SAS macros developed by Nicole Maestas. The macros calculate 
retirement benefit amounts for any claiming date between age 62 and 70, or any retirement date before age 
62 (assuming no further work after retirement). Since we do not model the joint retirement decision of 
couples, we treat respondents as single and ignore spousal benefits and survivor benefits. We construct the 
present value of Social Security benefits at time t by summing the stream of benefits payable at time t, 
weighted by life table survival probabilities (1998) and discounted at a real interest rate of 3 percent.   
 16 average OA/DI present value ratio is 69.2 percent in the “treatment” cohort, which is 
much lower than that in the “control” cohort (74.8 percent).  
Not all of the cross-cohort difference in the third relative generosity measure can be 
attributed to the FRA increase, given that the present value ratio is also dependent on the 
Primary Insurance Account (PIA), which is a piecewise linear function of the AIME. The 
“treatment” cohort, with a higher DI-insured rate as shown before, also has significantly 
higher AIME ($2,745 vs. $2,376), which is evidence of its higher life-time labor force 
participation level. AIME is not only a measure of life-time earnings but also a measure 
of potential future earnings. Because the DI program has very strong labor supply 
restrictions, those with higher AIME should be less likely to apply for DI, holding 
everything else constant. In Table 2 we also examine another labor force attachment 
measure – life-time total quarters of coverage. Although respondents in the treatment 
cohort are significantly younger (58.8 vs. 59.7), the total quarters of coverage they 
accumulate by time t are significantly greater compared to the control cohort (129.7 vs. 
126.0).  
 It is interesting to see that despite the large difference in past DI application rates 
(non-age-adjusted) disability status is similar across the cohorts. The time t fraction of 
people with a work limitation is 12.6 percent in the control cohort and 12.5 percent in the 
treatment cohort.   
Although their disability rates are similar, there could be differences in the severity 
and types of disabilities experienced across cohorts which could lead to differential 
propensities to apply for DI.  We examine a battery of objective and subjective health 
measures available in the HRS, including (1) sum of ADL and other functional 
 17 limitations (a 0-13 index counting the number of activities that the respondent reports 
having some difficulty performing
11), (2) self-reported fair or poor health, (3) sum of 
major health conditions (a 0-8 index
12), (4) whether often troubled with pain
13, (5) 
whether obese (with corrected BMI equal to or above 30)
  14 , and (6) subjective 
probability of living to age 75. We call our obesity measure “corrected” because we have 
adjusted the self-reported BMI based on height and weight measurements provided in the 
HRS biomarker data available in Wave 7 and Wave 8. In so doing, we follow the 
approach described in Cawley and Burkhuaser (2006).
15  
Although relatively younger on average, respondents in the treatment cohort 
experience more functional limitations (1.40 vs. 1.21), have more major health conditions 
                                                 
11 Those activities include: walking across the room, dressing, bathing, eating, getting in/out of bed, 
walking one block, walking several blocks, sitting for about 2 hours, getting up from a chair after sitting for 
long period, climbing one flight of stairs without resting, climbing several flights of stairs without resting, 
stooping/kneeling/crouching, and pushing/pulling large objects. These variables at Wave 1 and Wave 2 are 
not quite comparable to those in later waves. However, since our primary interest is in comparing the 
measure across cohorts rather than over time, we leave the inconsistent values in this comparison.  
12 These conditions include: high blood pressure, arthritis, mental health problem, cancer, stroke, lung 
diseases, diabetes, and heart problems.  
13 See Kapteyn et al (2008) for a study on the relationship between pain and disability.  
14 See Burkhauser and Cawley (2004) for a study on the relationship between obesity and DI enrollment.  
15When measuring body mass index (BMI), the HRS core survey only records respondents’ self-reported 
height and weight, both of which are subject to large measurement error, according to Cawley and 
Burkhauser (2006). In general, people tend to underreport their weights and overreport their heights, 
leading to an underestimate of obesity rate.  Cawley and Burkhauser (2006) have used a data set (NHANES 
III) that includes both self-reported and measured height and weight to estimate a prediction equation for 
the measured height and weight. Although some researchers (e.g., Michaud et al., 2007) have directly 
applied these coefficients to the HRS, the transportability of these coefficients is questionable. (Questions 
arise from the fact that the survey mode of NHANES III is face-to-face, while many other surveys, 
including the HRS, are generally conducted through telephone; the estimation sample in Cawley and 
Burkhauser (2006) does not include people older than 65; and the NHANES III covers the period from 
1988 to 1994, which is earlier than most HRS waves.) Because the HRS itself includes biomarker data for a 
random group of respondents at W7 and W8 (about 8,000 wave-respondent observations), it is more 
appropriate to use the HRS-based biomarker data to correct for the measurement error in the HRS self-
reported height and weight. Cawley and Burkhauser estimated separate models for gender and race groups 
because each group was essentially equally represented in the date. However, the HRS includes fewer black, 
Hispanic, and other races. Thus, we estimate pooled equations with weight and height interacted with 
gender and race. We also include self-reported fair or poor health, education, and self-reported BMI as 
controls. The predicted BMI is about 1.3 units higher than self-reported BMI. The cleaned obesity 
prevalence is about 8 percentage point higher than that based on self-reported height and weight.  Detailed 
estimates are available from authors upon request.  
 18 (1.21 vs. 1.11), are more frequently troubled with pain (20.5 percent vs. 18.9 percent), 
and are more likely to be obese (35.8 percent vs. 30.5 percent) than their counterparts, 
suggesting that their disabilities may be more severe.  
Comparing the demographic and SES variables, respondents in the treatment cohort 
are significantly younger, more racially diverse, better educated, have higher labor 
income, higher net worth
16, and are more likely to be covered by health insurance at time 
t. Generally speaking, those born after 1937 have a higher SES level, which might 
decrease their propensity to apply for DI. The marginal value of the DI benefit (and 
associated value of access to Medicare after two years of DI receipt) should be lower 
among high SES people because they have a higher opportunity cost of applying, a 
potentially lower discount rate on future OA benefits, are less likely to be liquidity 
constrained, have a higher chance of already possessing health insurance coverage, and 
may perceive greater social stigma associated with the take-up of government benefits 
labeled “disability” benefits.   
To sum up, cross-cohort differences also exist with respect to other observables that 
are potentially correlated with an individual’s propensity to apply for DI – especially, 
past DI application experience, life-time earnings, disability severity, and SES variables.  
In the next section we present estimates of the effect of the FRA increase on the DI 
application rate that control for these factors.  We note that data limitations have meant 
that most studies have been unable to control for life-time earnings or life-time total 
quarters of coverage (measures of labor force attachment); rather, these factors were 
                                                 
16 Net worth is the sum of assets (primary residence, other real estate, vehicles, businesses, IRAs, stocks, 
bonds, checking accounts, CDs, and other assets) less liabilities (mortgages, other home loans, and other 
debt). 
 19 unobservable omitted variables.  However, because our research design is based on 
access to administrative SSA records, we are able to control for these factors, and with 
very little measurement error.  In addition, we have shown that past DI application 
experience and the severity of underlying health problems clearly vary across cohorts, yet 
most studies have been unable to control for these (usually unobserved) cohort 
differences.  
 
5.3 Regression Estimation Results 
We estimate a set of probit models of DI application based on our analysis sample 
with 11,828 time t-t+2 observations. The estimation results are shown in Table 3. The 
dependent variable is whether the individual applied for DI between time t and t+2. Each 
column in Table 3 presents estimation results (coefficients and standard errors) from one 
specification of the model. For each specification, we include an indicator for having 
applied for DI before time t, the OA/DI relative generosity measure at time t+1, a third-
order polynomial in the AIME (allowing for a non-linear relationship between AIME and 
the DI application rate), life-time total quarters of coverage, health and disability status, 
demographics, and socioeconomic status at time t. The standard errors in all 
specifications are clustered by birth year because the exogenous variation in the OA/DI 
relative generosity measures originates from the difference in the FRA by birth year.  
To control for the fixed effects of age and calendar year, we add a flexible set of 
age band dummies (one dummy for each age band [55], [56-57], [58-59], [60-61], and 
[62, 63]) and interview wave dummies (one dummy for each interview wave) to all 
specifications. These are important because the DI application rate is correlated with the 
 20 unemployment rate and economic cycle (Autor and Duggan, 2006) and because the 
expected payoff associated with the decision to apply for DI also depends on the rejection 
rate, which varies by age and calendar year.  
We are interested in the effect of the FRA increase on the DI application rate as it 
operates through changes in the relative generosity between the OA and DI programs; 
relative generosity is measured by the OA/DI monthly benefit ratio in specifications (1)-
(3), and the OA/DI present value ratio in specifications (4)-(6).  Based on the third and 
the fourth panels in Figure 1, we hypothesize that the treatment effect might differ before 
and after the EEA (because OA enters the immediate choice set at the EEA) and among 
individuals with and without work limitations. To separately test these hypotheses, in 
specifications (2) and (5) we interact the generosity measure with a dummy equal to 1 if 
time t age is greater than or equal to 62; in specifications (3) and (6) we include a similar 
interaction term between the generosity measure and a dummy for having a work 
limitation at time t. The benchmark specifications (1) and (4) do not include any 
interaction terms. 
The estimation results vary across specifications. In specification (1), the 
coefficient for the OA/DI benefit ratio is negative and significant; while the coefficient 
for the OA/DI present value ratio is negative but insignificant in specification (4). We 
also find significant and negative coefficients on both types of interaction terms in 
specifications (2), (3), (5), and (6), suggesting that the decline in OA/DI relative 
generosity does encourage insured individuals to apply for DI after they reach the EEA or 
when they have a work-limiting health problem.  In each specification with the 
interaction terms ((2), (3), (5), and (6)), the coefficient for the OA/DI generosity measure 
 21 main effect becomes insignificant, implying that the effect of the change in OA/DI 
relative generosity is limited for people below the EEA or among people without a 
disability. 
The larger estimated effect of the relative OA/DI generosity among people with a 
work limitation seems natural – they have higher probability of receiving a DI award 
conditional on application due to their disability status. The change in the relative 
financial incentives between OA/DI is less relevant for people who do not have a work 
limitation, simply because they are less likely to be medically eligible for DI  
 How should we interpret the larger estimated effect at ages 62 and 63, which are 
the two oldest possible ages for claiming DI and also the ages when the possibility of 
claiming OA benefits enters one’s choice set? As suggested by Duggan et al. (2005), the 
effect of the FRA increase could rise with age for two complementary reasons: (1) 
potential applicants have a lower expected rejection rate as they grow older, and (2) 
people discount OA benefits less as they approach the EEA. In fact, they find the largest 
estimated effect of the FRA rise on DI enrollment at the two oldest ages: 63 and 64. To 
test whether our age 62/63 interaction term instead captures the first order positive 
correlation between the effect of OA/DI relative generosity on DI application and age, we 
experiment with replacing the “reaching EEA” interaction term with an alternative 
interaction between the relative OA/DI generosity measure and an age trend variable 
defined as age at time t minus 51 (the lowest bound of the age range in our sample). The 
coefficient on the new interaction term (not shown) is smaller and insignificant, either 
with or without inclusion of the original “reaching EEA” interaction term. This suggests 
that there is no effect of OA/DI generosity on DI application behavior as people age after 
 22 we control for the heterogeneity in the effect before and after age 62.  This points to a 
certain amount of myopia in decision-making; individuals do not appear to take account 
of the OA option when it is not in their immediate choice set.  
Most of the coefficients for the other covariates included in the model have the 
expected signs as discussed in section 5.2. Previous DI application before time t is 
strongly and positively correlated with DI application after t. Most health and disability 
measures have consistently strong and positive associations with DI application across 
specifications. Among the demographics and SES variables, being female and the 
number of schooling years have significant and negative associations with the DI 
application rate, suggesting that DI application is more likely to be selected as a 
retirement path by relatively disadvantaged people.  
To better interpret the regression estimates, we compute the marginal effect of the 
relative generosity variables in each specification. This is particularly important since the 
sign and significance of the coefficient for an interaction term in a nonlinear model does 
not necessarily match the sign and significance of the marginal effect of the interaction 
term (Ai and Norton (2003)).  We use the Stata module “inteff” (Norton et al., 2004) to 
compute the corrected average marginal effect for each interaction term of interest. The 
average marginal effects of the OA/DI relative generosity measure in specifications (1) 
and (4) are estimated using Stata module “margeff”, which is developed by Bartus (2005). 
The results are shown in the top panel of Table 4, where each row gives the marginal 
effect of interest for the different specifications in Table 3.  
The magnitudes of the average marginal effects are not consistent across the two 
benefit generosity measures. Generally speaking, the OA/DI benefit ratio is associated 
 23 with a larger marginal effect, suggesting that perhaps older people are more responsive to 
changes in terms of the more immediate and readily understandable monthly benefit 
amount; the change in terms of relative present value might be difficult to calculate and 
understand. We find that a one percentage point decrease in the OA/DI benefit ratio leads 
to a 0.527 percentage point increase in the DI application rate among people with a work 
limitation, while a one percentage point decrease in the OA/DI present value ratio only 
leads to a 0.149 percentage point increase in the DI application rate among the same 
sample. Not all of the marginal effects are statistically significant, most notably the 
average marginal effects for the generosity measures interacted with reaching the EEA at 
ages 62/63 are not statistically different from zero.   
In the second to fifth panels in Table 4, we present four sets of “treatment effect” 
estimates, those implied by each of two “treatments” – raising the FRA by 0.33 years and 
2 years (from age 65)– based on the two relative generosity measures (OA/DI benefit 
ratio or present value ratio). The “treatment effect” is the predicted change in the DI 
application rate attributed to the FRA increase. We use the treatment cohort sample for 
this exercise and also show the treatment effect for subsamples of those with ages at or 
beyond the EEA and those with a work limitation.  
In each panel, we show the predicted change in the relative generosity measure 
arising from the indicated FRA increase; 0.33 is the average FRA increase actually 
experienced by our HRS sample, whereas 2 years is the full legislated FRA increase.  The 
numbers in the column “change in OA/DI benefit/PV ratio” are the differences between 
the actual value of the relative generosity measure and the simulated value when the FRA 
was 65. Alternatively, the simulated changes in the relative generosity measures caused 
 24 by a “2 year” increase are the differences between the counterfactual values when the 
FRA is 67 and the values when the FRA is 65.  
Multiplying the simulated change in the relative generosity measure by the 
corresponding average marginal effect in the first panel gives the treatment effect of a 
given change in the FRA on the two-year DI application rate among the whole treatment 
cohort sample and the subsamples of interest.  The treatment effect resulting from the 
actual FRA increase (“0.33 year” increase) is 0.30 percentage points when the OA/DI 
benefit ratio is used, and 0.04 percentage points when the OA/DI present value ratio is 
used. Among people reaching the EEA, the treatment effect is 1.47 percentage points or 
1.31 percentage points, for the benefit ratio and present value ratios respectively.  Among 
people with a work-limiting health problem, the effect is 0.89 percentage points or 0.22 
percentage points for the benefit ratio and present value ratios, respectively. Although the 
estimates are somewhat different across generosity measures, it is not obvious which 
measure is superior.  The OA/DI benefit ratio and present value ratio are just two 
alternative ways of parameterizing the change in relative financial incentives between the 
two programs, and their salience for real decision-making probably depends on how 
forward-looking people are.     
It is of interest to compare our estimates to those reported in previous studies. 
However, the outcome variable in Duggan et al. (2005, 2007) is DI enrollment (a stock 
measure). It is difficult to transform our DI application estimates to something similar to 
theirs without an arbitrary assumption on the DI rejection rate (which is essentially a 
policy parameter that could be manipulated by the SSA in order to maintain target 
caseload levels) and lagged DI enrollment rate. Based on a structural dynamic 
 25 programming model, Bound et al. (2008) estimated a 0.2 percentage point increase in the 
one-year (time t-t+1) DI application rate in response to a simulated two-year FRA 
increase among single men in the original HRS cohort (b.1931-1941) who are (1) in the 
labor force at time t, and (2) have matched SSA records and private pension plan 
information. To facilitate comparison with their findings, we include a row for “single 
working men” (which is close to the definition used in Bound, et al. (2008)) in each of 
the four treatment effect panels, and convert our treatment effects, which pertain to the 
two-year DI application rate, to effects on the one-year application rate. We find that a 
two-year increase in the FRA increases the one-year DI application rate among single 
working men by 0.12-0.46 percentage points. Bound, et al. (2008)’s estimate (0.2 
percentage points) falls within this range.  
6.  Conclusion 
As the full retirement age rises, the generosity of the Social Security retirement 
benefit drops relative to the disability benefit, resulting in an incentive for people to 
substitute toward applying for disability benefits as an alternative way of exiting the labor 
force. This paper examines the actual behavioral response to this policy change by 
comparing the DI application rates of two birth cohorts in the Health and Retirement 
Study, one (b.1931-1937) unaffected by the change and the other (b.1938-1940) affected 
by the change. 
Descriptive analyses reveal that the cohort affected by the FRA increase has a 
higher DI application rate only among the subsample of people with a work limitation at 
or after the earliest eligibility age for retirement benefits.  We estimate a set of probit 
models of DI application to control for other covariates that potentially affect the decision 
 26 to apply for DI, especially health and disability status, past DI application experience, life 
time earnings and labor force attachment, socioeconomic status, age, and calendar year. 
The predicted treatment effect of the FRA increase (ranging from 2 months to 6 months, 
with average of four months) on the two-year DI application rate among people born 
between 1938 and 1940 is relatively small – between 0.04 and 0.30 percentage points 
depending on the way we characterize the treatment (by either the benefit ratio or the 
present value ratio). The effect is significantly larger among those with a health problem 
that limits their work capacity.  
Our results imply that the spillover effect of the FRA increase on the DI program is 
small.  Even though the effect is larger among individuals with a work limiting health 
problem, people with work limitations only account for 12.3 percent of our sample. Our 
estimate is similar to estimates reported by Bound, Stinebrickner, and Waidmann (2008), 
who predicted that the rise in the FRA was likely to have quite small effects on 
applications for DI.     
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 30 Figure 1. DI Application Rates by Birth Cohort (FRA=65: b.1931-1937; FRA>65: b.1938-1940) 
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Notes: Sample includes HRS respondents from the original HRS cohort born in 1931-1940 who (1) reached their FRA by Wave 8, and (2) had matched SSA 
earnings records. Time t to time t+2 DI application rate is conditional on being currently insured by DI and not applying/receiving DI at time t.  
 Table 1. Policy Variation across Birth Cohorts Selected for Comparison and Data Availability in HRS
Birth Cohorts Birth Year FRA
in the Sample W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8
Age 62 Age 63 Age 64 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
"Control" Cohort 1931 65 80.0% 86.7% 93.3% 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75
  Total # in HRS: 4,772 1932 65 80.0% 86.7% 93.3% 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74
  # w/ SSA Match: 4,061 1933 65 80.0% 86.7% 93.3% 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73
1934 65 80.0% 86.7% 93.3% 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72
1935 65 80.0% 86.7% 93.3% 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71
1936 65 80.0% 86.7% 93.3% 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70
1937 65 80.0% 86.7% 93.3% 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69
"Treatment" Cohort 1938 65 and 2 months 79.2% 85.6% 92.2% 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68
  Total # in HRS: 1,976 1939 65 and 4 months 78.3% 84.4% 91.1% 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67
  # w/ SSA Match: 1,666 1940 65 and 6 months 77.5% 83.3% 90.0% 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66
HRS Waves Preceeding FRA for Birth Cohort 1931-1937
HRS Waves Preceeding FRA for Birth Cohort 1938-1940
OA/DI Benefit Ratio at Age at HRS Interview Waves and Corresponding Calendar Years
Note: Sample includes age-eligible respondents from the original HRS cohort who 
reached their FRA by Wave 8.Table 2. Cohort Comparison of DI Application Rate and Related Observables
FRA=65 FRA>65
b. 1931-1937 b. 1938-1940 T-Ratio
Applied for DI between t and t+2 3.0% 2.7% 0.90
Ever Applied for DI before t 3.4% 4.3% -2.47
OA/DI Generosity Measures at t+1
FRA 65 65.33 -156.78
OA Benefit/DI Benefit  82.72% 80.28% 28.93
OA Present Value/DI Present Value 74.78% 69.16% 24.51
Lifetime Earnings and Labor Force Attachment at t
AIME $2,376 $2,745 -12.84
Lifetime Total Quarters of Coverage 126.0 129.7 -5.64
Health and Disability Status at t
Work Limitation  12.6% 12.5% 0.18
Sum of ADLs and Other Functional Limitations (0-13) 1.21 1.40 -5.26
Self-Reported Fair or Poor Health  13.1% 14.1% -1.53
Sum of Major Health Conditions (0-8) 1.11 1.21 -4.99
Often Troubled with Pain 18.9% 20.5% -2.13
Obese (Corrected BMI>=30) 30.5% 35.8% -5.84
Probability of Living to 75 or More  67.3% 68.2% -0.02
Demographics and Socioeconomic Status
Female 48.9% 49.1% -0.21
Age at t 59.7 58.8 18.64
Years of Education  12.6 13.0 -6.81
Nonwhite 19.5% 21.7% -2.83
Not Married at t 25.9% 26.5% -0.67
Labor Income at t $39,098 $48,379 -6.81
Household Non-Labor Income at t $23,758 $25,370 -1.29
Net Worth at t $289,338 $357,099 -3.81
Covered by Health Insurance at t 80.4% 82.3% -2.59
Person-Wave Observations 7,654 4,174
Notes: Sample includes time t to time t+2 transitions made by HRS respondents from the original HRS 
cohort born in 1931-1940 who (1) reached their FRA by Wave 8, (2) had matched SSA earnings records, 
and (3) were insured by DI at t, but not applying for or receiving DI at t, and between age 55 and age 63 at 
time t.  All dollar amounts are expressed in 2006 dollars. Table 3. Probit Model of DI Application between t and t+2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ever Applied for DI before t   0.231***   0.233***   0.216***   0.233***   0.231***   0.209***
(0.076)    (0.077)    (0.073)    (0.074)    (0.076)    (0.072)   
OA/DI Generosity Measures at t+1
OA Benefit/DI Benefit   -3.174***   4.889     -1.791   
(1.096)    (4.092)    (1.222)   
(OA/DI Benefit Ratio)*I(Age at t>=62)  -9.473** 
(4.727)   
(OA/DI Benefit Ratio)*Work Limitation  -4.794***
(1.439)   
OA Present Value/DI Present Value   -0.508      0.925     -0.019   
(0.616)    (0.832)    (0.662)   
(OA/DI Present Value Ratio)*I(Age at t>=62)  -5.445***
(1.624)   
(OA/DI Present Value Ratio)*Work Limitation  -1.607***
(0.445)   
Lifetime Earnings and Labor Force Attachment at t
AIME (10,000)  -1.486     -1.401     -1.351     -1.394    -1.449 -1.350
(1.738)    (1.734)    (1.756)    (1.692)    (1.727)    (1.663)   
AIME^2 (10,000)   1.098      0.661      0.702      0.788      0.872      0.840   
(6.895)    (6.990)    (6.959)    (6.713)    (6.868)    (6.662)   
AIME^3 (10,000)   0.077      0.777      0.498      0.470      0.479      0.283   
(9.060)    (9.301)    (9.120)    (8.879)    (9.071)    (8.808)   
Lifetime Total Quarters of Coverage   0.002      0.002      0.002      0.002      0.002      0.002   
(0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)   
Health and Disability Status at t
Work Limitation    0.419***   0.419***   4.298***   0.419***   0.420***   1.551***
(0.121)    (0.120)    (1.185)    (0.122)    (0.121)    (0.366)   
Sum of ADLs and Other Functional Limitations (0-13)   0.079***   0.079***   0.081***   0.079***   0.079***   0.082***
(0.020)    (0.020)    (0.020)    (0.020)    (0.020)    (0.019)   
Self-Reported Fair or Poor Health    0.335***   0.333***   0.332***   0.337***   0.334***   0.335***
(0.062)    (0.062)    (0.061)    (0.062)    (0.063)    (0.062)   
Sum of Major Health Conditions (0-8)   0.067**    0.068**    0.069**    0.067**    0.067**    0.070** 
(0.027)    (0.027)    (0.027)    (0.027)    (0.027)    (0.028)   
Often Troubled with Pain   0.109      0.112      0.106      0.109      0.111      0.102   
(0.065)    (0.064)    (0.063)    (0.064)    (0.065)    (0.064)   
Being Obese (Corrected BMI>=30)  -0.068     -0.065     -0.071     -0.067     -0.066     -0.069   
(0.076)    (0.076)    (0.076)    (0.076)    (0.075)    (0.076)   
Probability of Living to 75 or More  -0.000     -0.000     -0.000     -0.000     -0.000     -0.000   
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
Demographics and Socioeconomic Status
Female   -0.133**   -0.133**   -0.131**   -0.125**   -0.143***  -0.124** 
(0.054)    (0.054)    (0.053)    (0.055)    (0.053)    (0.056)   
Years of Education   -0.034***  -0.034***  -0.034***  -0.034***  -0.034***  -0.034***
(0.010)    (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.010)   
Nonwhite    0.036      0.035      0.036      0.038      0.035      0.039   
(0.052)    (0.052)    (0.052)    (0.052)    (0.052)    (0.051)   
Not Married at t   0.074      0.074      0.079      0.072      0.074      0.075   
(0.053)    (0.054)    (0.052)    (0.053)    (0.053)    (0.051)   
Labor Income at t (10,000)  -0.002     -0.002     -0.001     -0.002     -0.002     -0.001   
(0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.007)   
Household Non-Labor Income at t (10,000)   0.002      0.002      0.002      0.002      0.002      0.002   
(0.006)    (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.006)   
Net Worth at t (10,000)  -0.000     -0.000     -0.000     -0.000     -0.000     -0.000   
(0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
Covered by Health Insurance at t  -0.085     -0.089     -0.083     -0.085     -0.087     -0.085   
(0.055)    (0.055)    (0.056)    (0.055)    (0.055)    (0.057)   
Observations 11828 11828 11828 11828 11828 11828
Log Likelihood  -1256 -1255 -1252 -1258 -1255 -1253
Pseudo R-squared  0.1942 0.1952 0.1973 0.1934 0.1950 0.1966
Notes: Sample includes time t to time t+2 transitions made by HRS respondents from the original HRS cohort born in 1931-1940 
who (1) reached their FRA by Wave 8, (2) had matched SSA earnings records, and (3) were insured by DI at t, but not applying for 
or receiving DI at t, and between age 55 and age 63 at time t. All specifications include a constant, dummies for age bands ([55], 
[56-57], [58-59], [60-61], and [62, 63]),  and each interview wave. All dollar amounts are expressed in 2006 dollars. Standard errors 
in all specifications are clustered by birth year.
**, ***: Significant on a 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. Table 4. Treatment Effect of the FRA Increase Among People Born in 1938-1940
OA/DI Generosity Measures at t+1 Standard Error
OA/DI Benefit Ratio  -0.173 *** 0.065
(OA/DI Benefit Ratio)*I(Age at t>=62) -0.639 0.477
(OA/DI Benefit Ratio)*Work Limitation -0.527 *** 0.168
OA/DI Present Value Ratio -0.028 -0.028
(OA/DI Present Value Ratio)*I(Age at t>=62) -0.568 0.342
(OA/DI Present Value Ratio)*Work Limitation -0.149 *** 0.045
Increase in the FRA=0.33 Year
Whole Sample (#: 4,174) -1.8% 0.30% *** 0.15% ***
Subsamples by Time t Characteristics
  Age>=62 (#: 840) -2.3% 1.47% 0.74%
  With Work Limitation (#: 523) -1.7% 0.89% *** 0.45% ***
  Single Working Men (#: 292) -1.7% 0.29% *** 0.15% ***
Increase in the FRA=2 Years
Whole Sample (#: 4,174) -5.3% 0.92% *** 0.46% ***
Subsamples by Time t Characteristics
  Age>=62 (#: 840) -6.7% 4.26% 2.15%
  With Work Limitation (#: 523) -5.4% 2.82% *** 1.42% ***
  Single Working Men (#: 292) -5.3% 0.92% *** 0.46% ***
Increase in the FRA=0.33 Year
Whole Sample (#: 4,174) -1.5% 0.04% 0.02%
Subsamples by Time t Characteristics
  Age>=62 (#: 840) -2.3% 1.31% 0.66%
  With Work Limitation (#: 523) -1.5% 0.22% *** 0.11% ***
  Single Working Men (#: 292) -1.5% 0.04% 0.02%
Increase in the FRA=2 Years
Whole Sample (#: 4,174) -9.1% 0.25% 0.13%
Subsamples by Time t Characteristics
  Age>=62 (#: 840) -12.5% 7.12% 3.62%
  With Work Limitation (#: 523) -9.2% 1.37% *** 0.69% ***
  Single Working Men (#: 292) -8.9% 0.25% 0.12%
Treatment Effect
Average Marginal Effect
Change in OA/DI Benefit Ratio Treatment Effect
(1-Year DI Application)
Change in OA/DI Benefit Ratio Treatment Effect
(1-Year DI Application)
(2-Year DI Application) (1-Year DI Application)
Change in OA/DI PV Ratio Treatment Effect Treatment Effect
(2-Year DI Application) (1-Year DI Application)
Table 3, Specification (4)
Table 3, Specification (5)
Table 3, Specification (6)




Based on Which Model
Table 3, Specification (1)
Table 3, Specification (2)
Table 3, Specification (3)
Notes: Sample includes time t to time t+2 transitions made by HRS respondents from the original HRS cohort born in 1938-1940 
who (1) reached their FRA by Wave 8, (2) had matched SSA earnings records, and (3) were insured by DI at t, but not applying for or 
receiving DI at t, and between age 55 and age 63 at time t. 
**, ***: Significant on a 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.     